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Abstract
Information aggregation is at the core of many problems in computer science.
Judgment aggregation models multi-agent decision making by aggregating
individual opinions from various sources. It does however assume that the
sources provide Boolean opinions which are subject to the same logical
constraints. We relax both of these assumptions and build a more general
framework with uncertain information that we model in probabilistic logic.
We also propose aggregation functions for this new framework.
Introduction
p p→ q q
Minister 1 true true true
Minister 2 true false false
Minister 3 false true false
Majority true true false
Table 1: An example of a judgment
aggregation.
Judgment aggregation [2] is concerned with aggre-
gating sets of truth valuations assigned to logically
related issues. Consider an example from [5] with
the following issues: Current CO2 emissions lead
to global warming (p); If current CO2 emissions
lead to global warming, then we should reduce CO2
emissions (p→ q); We should reduce CO2 emis-
sions (q). Each of these issues can be assigned val-
ues “true" or “false" as in Table 1. Taking the majority of truth valuations on an issue as
the collective judgment for that issue does not always lead to a consistent set of collective
judgments, as illustrated with this example.
Various collective decision making problems in artificial intelligence (AI) can be mod-
elled as judgment aggregation problems such as the problem of finding a collective goal
in multi agent systems [6] or when one agent needs to find the truth valuations for each of
a set of issues by merging information from various sources. We give a simple example.
s∨ t h x ¬e
IS 1 0.6 1 1 1
IS 2 0.7 0.5 0.6 1
IS 3 0.1 0.2 0.4 1
IS 4 0.8 0.9 0.8 1
IS 5 0.7 0.4 0.7 1
IS 6 0.5 0.3 0.6 1
Table 2: An example of a
source aggregation.
Consider a hotel recommender agent that compiles
recommendation for a user by analysing and merging
information on hotels from online sources. The user can
specify what are the features of a good hotel such as: either
close to the centre or well connected with public transport
(s∨ t); the hotel is a unique experience (x), the hotel is a
good value for money (a). The agent should recommend the
hotel (h) iff s∨ t and a are assigned a judgment true, i.e.
((s∨ t)∧ a)↔ h. The user considers a hotel is a good value
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for money (a) if it is not more than 80 Euro per night (¬e) or it is a unique experience
(x), so (¬e ∨ x) → a. The reviewers, and the hotels, are typically not available for
questioning and specifying their information for each recommender agent, but the price
of the service would most likely be available online. Ideally each information source
(IS) will be processed automatically, meaning that the agent will have the likelihood
that a judgment is confirmed by an information source rather than a Boolean truth value
assignment [1]. An example of an input from six sources is given in Table 2. We need
to be able to aggregate these probabilistic judgment from Table 2 into a set of Boolean
judgments for each of the propositions in {s∨ t,h, x,a} so that they are also consistent with
{(¬e∨ x)→ a, ((s∨ t)∧ a)↔ h}. It is unreasonable to expect that all the sources would
satisfy the user set constraints. To model more realistically the aggregation problem, we
need to extend the existing framework into a probabilistic one and design aggregation
functions for it. This is our object of study.
Probabilistic judgment aggregation
We distinguish between an agenda setter and information sources (agents). The agenda
setter identifies the set of issues, i.e., the agenda for which judgments need to be made.
The agenda Φ is a finite set of propositional logic formulas,
Φ = {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn},
such that ϕi is neither a tautology nor a contradiction. We define the set of propositional
constraints as a set of propositional formulas Γ representing special relations that should
hold among the agenda issues. Γ should be satisfiable, and we allow Γ = {>}. The agenda
setter is interested in aggregating collections of judgments on the agenda issues from
various information sources into a set of Boolean judgments that is consistent with Γ.
A Boolean judgment [4] on ϕ ∈Φ is either ϕ or ¬ϕ. A (crisp) set of judgments J on the
agenda Φ is a set containing only Boolean judgments on the elements of Φ. For example,
J = {ϕ1,¬ϕ2}. The presence of ϕ in J is interpreted as issue ϕ being assigned the value
“true" and the presence of ¬ϕ in J is interpreted as issue ϕ being “false" according to the
judgment set J. The judgment set J is complete if it contains one Boolean judgment for
each of the issues in the agenda. If the crisp judgment set J is consistent and complete,
we say that it is rational.
A probabilistic judgment on the issue ϕ ∈Φ is a simple likelihood formula of the type
`(ϕ) ≥∗ a,
where ≥∗∈ {≥,=} and a ∈ [0,1].1 The judgment `(ϕ) ≥ a expresses that the likelihood
(probability) of the statement ϕ being true is at least a. It immediately implies that
`(¬ϕ) ≤ 1− a. `(ϕ) = a is a stronger statement expressing that the likelihood of ϕ being
true is exactly a. (And `(¬ϕ) = 1− a correspondingly). `(ϕ) = a implies `(ϕ) ≥ a. In
general, if `(ϕ) ≥∗ a implies `(ϕ) ≥∗ b (a ≥ b) we will say that `(ϕ) ≥∗ a is a stronger
judgment then `(ϕ) ≥∗ b.
A probabilistic judgment set Jˆ is a set consisting of one probabilistic judgment on
each of the issues in the agenda:
Jˆ = {`(ϕ1) ≥∗ a1, . . . , `(ϕn) ≥∗ an}. (1)
1The likelihood formulas that we use here are taken from the language for reasoning about likelihood [3].
The general form of a linear likelihood formula is a1`(ϕ1) + . . .+ an`(ϕn) ≥ a. This language is interpreted
over measurable probability structures and the corresponding axiomatic system is based on the properties
of probability functions.
Defined like this, a probabilistic judgment set is always complete since, in the case of
“abstention” on an issue ϕ, we assume the tautology `(ϕ) ≥ 0.
In the probabilistic case, consistency and completeness are not enough of conditions
for rationality. For example, Jˆ = {`(p1) ≥ 0.3, `(p1 ∧ p2) ≥ 0.4, `(p1 ∧¬p2) ≥ 0.1} is a
consistent judgment set. However, the second formula in it implies that `(p1) ≥ 0.4,
which is a stronger judgment then the existing `(p1) ≥ 0.3 and, as such, is a more
valuable judgment. To ensure that we always have the strongest possible judgments in
the consistent judgment sets, we introduce the notion of a final judgment. A consistent
probabilistic judgment set is final if it does not imply stronger judgmnts than the ones it
contains. A probabilistic judgment set Jˆ is rational if it is consistent and final.
Probabilistic judgments can be subject to probabilistic constraints Γˆ to denote that
certain combinations of issues must have a certain likelihood. For example for agenda
Φ = {p1, p2, p3}, where p1, p2, and p3 represent the three possible states of a random
variable, we can have the integrity constraint `(p1) + `(p2) + `(p3) = 1. Unlike the
constraints Γ which are given by the agenda setter, the integrity constraints Γˆ describe
facts of the world and we assume that all information sources provide probabilistic
judgment sets that satisfy the integrity constraints when these are given. The probabilistic
constraints Γˆ apply only to probabilistic, but not to crisp judgment sets.
Given the above, we can define our problem of interest as follows: Given m rational
probabilistic judgment sets on the issues of an agenda Φ coming from m different
information sources, to aggregate this judgment sets in a meaningful way in order to
obtain a rational crisp judgment set as a result. In the following section, we propose a
couple of different functions (aggregators) for this purpose.
Aggregators
A (crisp) profile P for m agents is a finite sequence of rational judgment sets P =
(J1, . . . , Jm), where Jk, k = 1, . . . ,m is the judgment set of the agent k. A probabilistic
profile is a sequence of probabilistic judgment sets:
Pˆ = (Jˆ1, . . . , Jˆm),where Jˆk = {`(ϕ1) ≥∗ ak1, . . . , `(ϕn) ≥∗ akn}
is the judgment set coming from the kth information source.
Given a probabilistic judgment `(ϕ) ≥∗ a, we can obtain a crisp judgment by choosing
a coefficient c ∈ (0,1]:
crisp(`(ϕ) ≥∗ a,c) =
{
ϕ iff a ≥ c
¬ϕ iff a < c (2)
In the above definition, the coefficient c acts as a “strictness” coefficient for the
crispifying. Namely, it determines how probable the issues should be (in the least) in
order to consider them as true. Obviously, its value is context dependent. We assume that
it is determined by the agenda setter. We can crispify a probabilistic judgment set Jˆ by
crispifying each of its judgments. Let c = (c1, . . . ,cn) be a given vector of coefficients,
where each ci corresponds to one issue ϕi ∈Φ and ci ∈ (0,1] for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. Then the
crisp judgment set obtained from Jˆ and c is defined as
crisp(Jˆ,c) = {crisp(`(ϕi) ≥∗ ai,ci) | `(ϕi) ≥∗ ai ∈ Jˆ}. (3)
If ci = c, for every i = 1, . . . ,n, for some c ∈ (0,1], we denote crisp(Jˆ,c) by crisp(Jˆ,c) and
we call it a uniform crispifying.
Uniform quota rules Given a profile Pˆ, a crispifying vector c and a quota q ∈ N,
1 ≤ q ≤ m, let Na(Pˆ,ϕi) denote the number of agents for which the likelihood of ϕi is
greater that a. Then we can define eq(Pˆ,ϕi) as the maximal rational number a ∈ (0,1) s.t.
Na(Pˆ,ϕi) ≥ q. We can now define the uniform quota function fˆq:
fˆq(Pˆ,c) = {ϕi : eq(Pˆ,ϕi) > ci}∪ {¬ϕi : eq(Pˆ,ϕi) < ci}.
As an illustration, consider the example in Table 2. For uniform c = 0.6 and quota
q = 3 we obtain fˆ3(Pˆ,0.6) = {s∨ t, x,¬h,¬e}, which is not consistent with Γ.
If q = m, we obtain the unanimous function that selects as collective only those
judgments ϕi who are assigned a likelihood aki > ci by all the agents k. For q =
m
2 we
obtain the issue-by-issue majority function, which we denote with M. Under issue-by-
issue majority function the profile is aggregated by selecting the judgments that are in the
most of the judgment sets in the profile. The set fˆ m
2
(Pˆ,c) = M(Pˆ,c) is called a majoritarian
set for Pˆ.
Aggregating without a quota There are two dimensions that can play a role in
determining the likelihood of a judgment determined by a profile: which likelihoods are
assigned to that judgment in the profile and by how many agents.
Let `Pˆ(ϕ) = a denote that the likelihood of ϕ induced by profile Pˆ is a. The simplest
way to determine a is to take the average of likelihoods in the profile.






i , if there exist at least one agent k for which a
k
i > 0, otherwise EPˆ(ϕi) = 0.5. For¬ϕi we have that EPˆ(¬ϕi) = 1−EPˆ(ϕi).
Future work
Once having defined the framework for aggregating probabilistic judgments the
immediate next step is to inspect the characterisation of aggregation functions. Namely
we can look for the most common desirable properties of aggregation and establish
whether there exists an aggregation function that satisfies them. Experience from
(computational) social choice theory indicates that an ideal aggregate, one that satisfies
all desirable properties, does not exist. Consequently, we need to design a selection of
aggregation functions, to cover different aggregation problems. Another immediate step
is to consider the computational complexity of calculating the collective judgments.
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